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This suggestion is based on the premise that social cognition is fundamentally different when we 
are in interaction with others rather than merely observing them. In this article, we outline the 
theoretical conception of a second-person approach to other minds and review evidence from 
neuroimaging, psychophysiological studies and related fields to argue for the development of a 
second-person neuroscience, which will help neuroscience to really go social; this may also be 
relevant for our understanding of psychiatric disorders construed as disorders of social cognition. 
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 “No more fiendish punishment could be devised, were such thing physically possible, than that one 
should be turned loose in society and remain absolutely unnoticed.” 
William James (1890), The Principles of Psychology. 
 
1. Introduction 
The burgeoning field of social neuroscience has begun to illuminate the complex biological bases 
of human social cognitive abilities (Frith & Frith 2010; Ochsner & Lieberman 2001). Many 
investigations have focused, in particular, on the neural correlates of our capacity to grasp the 
mental states of others. Two neuroanatomically distinct large-scale networks have gained center 
stage as the neural substrates of social cognition: the so-called “mirror neuron system” (MNS) 
and the “mentalizing network” (MENT). The former has been taken as evidence for a 
simulationist account of social cognition and is believed to give us a “first-person grasp” of the 
motor goals and intentions of other individuals (Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia 2010). The latter has 
been seen as providing evidence for a “Theory Theory” account of social cognition believe to 
give us an inferential, reflective (and what might be called a ‘third-person’) grasp of others’ 
mental states (Frith & Frith 2006, 2010). The apparent disparity between these sets of results 
may, however, arise from differences in the experimental paradigms used (cf. Keysers & Gazzola 
2007), which run the danger of presupposing the very theoretical frameworks they claim to test. 
Consequently, both of these paradigms are investigating actual, but limited domains of social 
cognition. Both are, in effect, committed to spectator theories of knowledge. They have focused 
on the use of “isolation paradigms” (Becchio et al. 2010), in which participants are required to 
merely observe others or think about their mental states rather than participate in social 
interaction with them. Consequently, it has remained unclear whether and how activity in the 
large-scale neural networks described above is modulated by the degree to which a person does 
or does not feel actively involved in an ongoing interaction and whether the networks might 
subserve complementary or mutually exclusive roles in this case (Schilbach 2010). After more 
than a decade of research, the neural mechanisms underlying social interaction have remained 
elusive and could —paradoxically— be seen as representing the ‘dark matter’1 of social 
                                                
1  In sensu strictu, the term dark matter is used in physics and astronomy to describe matter, which is inferred 
to exist, but which has not been directly observed and may not even be observable. We use the term metaphorically 
to denote an important lacuna in current areas of research in social neuroscience, which have been more difficult to 
investigate and where, therefore, less is known, but which can at least in principle be explored empirically. To index 
this particular usage of the term, ‘dark matter’ is consistently used in inverted commas throughout the paper. 
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neuroscience. 
In this target article we propose an approach to the investigation of social cognition focused on 
‘second-person’ engagements. This approach, we argue, will help to throw light on this ‘dark 
matter’ and may help social neuroscience to really go social. 
 
1.1 Spectator Theories of Other Minds 
Spectatorial accounts of social knowing are not restricted to social neuroscience, but have been 
central to the Western intellectual tradition (Dewey 1950). Psychological accounts of how people 
make sense of other people have usually shared a common format: 
 
Each is a detached observer, rather than actively engaged with the other in 
some joint project. 
The information available to each of us about other people is limited and 
disorganized, and hence there is a gulf between what we can actually 
observe about them, and what they themselves feel, intend, or believe. 
Each of us, therefore, has to engage in some or other intellectual ‘detour’ 
to bridge the gap between what can be immediately experienced about the 
other person and that person’s psychological states (see Asch 1952). 
 
As Neisser has pointed out, this detached and intellectualist theoretical approach to how people 
make sense of one another has been built into the research which was supposed to support that 
very position: namely, people observing video-recordings of other people, and making judgments 
of what they saw: 
 
The theories and experiments ... all refer to an essentially passive 
onlooker, who sees someone do something (or sees two people do 
something) and then makes a judgment about it. He … doesn’t mix it up 
with the folks he’s watching, never tests his judgments in action or 
interaction. He just watches and makes judgments. [...] When people are 
genuinely engaged with one another, nobody stops to give grades (Neisser 
1980, pp.603-4). 
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Modern cognitive psychology has retained “methodological behaviorism” from precisely the 
psychology it claims to have undermined (see Costall 2006; Garner 1999; Jenkins 1986; Leahey 
1992; Neisser 1997). According to the textbooks, psychologists in their research necessarily start 
from the observation of inherently meaningless, “colorless behavior” (Hull 1943, p.25) and can 
only begin to make psychological sense of what they observe on the basis of theorizing. Few 
modern psychologists, of course, are Cartesian dualists: they rightly insist that they do not make 
an ontological disjunction between behavior and mind. 
 
Nevertheless, psychologists keep framing their methodology, in principle if not in their actual 
practice, in the old Hullian, reductionist terms, and hence keep talking themselves into a 
methodological dualism of behavior and mind. In so doing, they resurrect for themselves the 
traditional dualistic ‘problem’ of other minds. And, when Theory Theorists project this 
methodology onto other people and how they make sense of one another, they often enough also 
carry the same insoluble problem with them. In relation to the other domains to which it has been 
applied, the “Theory Theory” approach has taken for granted that the child has already acquired a 
substantial practical understanding of the social domain before attempting to systematize his or 
her existing knowledge (such as friction or collisions in the domain of physics, and reproduction 
and growth in the domain of biology). This is not the case for “Theory Theory” of Mind (TToM) 
in its original form, for, according to TToM, it is only once children have developed a “Theory of 
Mind” that they have access to any of the necessary psychological data upon which the theory 
could be based. 
 
Of course, “Theory of Mind” does not refer to a theory in the scientific sense, but denotes an 
empirical field of study with (apparently) no particular theoretical commitments (cf. Penn & 
Povinelli 2008, p.394). Yet to the extent that the most important alternative approach, 
“Simulation Theory”, frames the problem of how people make sense of other people in terms of 
how psychologists make a detour from the observation of ‘mere’ behavior to psychological states 
they both face the same logical impasse. Indeed, there could be no naturally occurring precursors 
to “Theory of Mind”, not even evolved ones, if the problem of how we really make sense of one 
another is framed in terms of this kind of methodological dualism (see Costall et al. 2006; Leudar 
& Costall 2008). 
 
 5 
1.2 An alternative account of social knowing 
Before the rise of recent social cognition research there was already an important body of theory 
and research proposing that, typically, when relating to one another, people are not engaged in a 
tortuous process of inferences and theorizing about one another, but immediately experience the 
other as a subject (see Asch 1952; Heider & Simmel 1944; Runeson & Frykholm 1983; Schutz 
1972; Thinès et al. 1991). This approach drew upon Gestalt theory and phenomenology. Here is 
Solomon Asch's lucid statement of this position: 
 
The quality of their actions imbues persons with living reality. When we 
say that a person is in pain, we see his body as feeling. We do not need to 
‘impute’ consciousness to others if we directly perceive the qualities of 
consciousness in the qualities of action. Once we see an act that is skillful, 
clumsy, alert, or reckless, it is superfluous to go ‘behind’ it to its 
conscious substrate, for consciousness has revealed itself in the act (Asch 
1952, p.158). 
 
This social perception approach is close to the theoretical perspective we are presenting in this 
target article. It is not detached; it is not dispassionate. However, it is, nevertheless, committed to 
an observer epistemology, a spectator theory of how we relate to other people. Knowing others is 
limited to perceiving them. In this target article, we will be arguing for an approach to social 
knowing based on interaction and emotional engagements between people, rather than mere 
observation. This ‘second-person’ approach has already begun to prove productive within 
developmental and social psychology and points toward the importance of experiencing and 
interacting with others as our primary ways of knowing them (see Section 2 for details). Also, 
preliminary evidence from neuroimaging and psychophysiological studies demonstrates profound 
differences in neural processing related to the reciprocity of social interaction, which is consistent 
with our proposal that the second-person approach can make an important contribution to the 
neuroscientific study of social encounters and could, in fact, lead to the development of a second-
person neuroscience (Section 3). In this respect, we provide an outlook for future research by 
describing key ideas and objectives of a second-person neuroscience and related objectives in 
other areas of research (Section 4). Finally, we argue that the second-person account may also be 
relevant for our understanding of psychiatric disorders: While psychiatric disorders such as 
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autism have been conceptualized as disorders of explicit social cognition, recent evidence 
suggests that the implicit processes of interpersonal coordination relevant during second-person 
engagements might be more closely related to the core impairments (Section 5). 
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2. Second-Person Engagements 
2.1 Overcoming the Spectatorial Gap 
Spectatorial views of cognition have been developed within the paradigm of standard cognitive 
science, which understands cognition as information processing in the sense of a passive intake 
of information provided by a ready-made world. Embodied cognition replaces this view by a 
concept in which perception is seen as an active process executed by an organism situated in the 
environment the subjects of which are not isolated from but embedded and coupled in the 
perceived world (Thompson 2007). Such coupling brings to the fore new properties —what 
Gibson (1979) calls “affordances”— which depend on the organism’s specific potential and 
actual interaction with the environment. In this way, cognition is essentially construed as an 
activity carried out by an embodied and embedded agent. In addition to hybrid accounts of 
“Theory Theory” and “Simulation Theory” (e.g., Goldman 2006; see Newen & Schlicht 2009 for 
a critical discussion), recent debates have, therefore, led to alternatives, which emphasize various 
aspects of embeddedness and embodiedness in social cognition (De Jaegher & Di Paolo 2007; 
Fuchs 2009; Gallagher 2005, 2008; Hutto 2008; Noë 2009; Reddy 2008; Zahavi 2005). 
 
Spectatorial views construe social cognition as something that could in principle occur in the 
presence of a one-way mirror, where a detached observer reads out the mental states of another 
person, who, in turn, is not affected by this and cannot react to it. In contrast to this, our central 
claims are that social cognition is fundamentally different when (2.1.1) we are emotionally 
engaged with someone as compared to adopting an attitude of detachment and when (2.1.2) we 
are in interaction with someone as compared to merely observing her (Figure 1 A - D). 
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Figure 1. 
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Legend: 
Figures 1 A-D: 
Center: Schematic depiction of interaction contingencies for situations of (A) no (or little) social 
interaction and no (or little) emotional engagement, (B) no (or little) social interaction, but emotional 
engagement of person A with person B, (C) social interaction, but no (or little) emotional engagement and 
(D) social interaction and emotional engagement. Dotted lines indicate the absence or relatively decreased 
influence of actions on oneself (vertical arrows) or the other (oblique arrows), temporal sequence is shown 
from top to bottom (schematic of interaction contingences adapted from: Jones & Gerard 1967). Despite 
the suggestion of linearity in the interaction sequence, our account also stresses the importance of 
interaction dynamics, which may be seen as emergent properties of an interaction, and possible inter-brain 
effects of social interaction (see section 2.3 & 3.2.2 for details). 
 
Left & right: Schematic depiction of putative differences in the recruitment of brain regions during 
situations A-D and their functional connectivity (see Section 3 for details). Brain regions on the medial 
surface or deep structures of the brain are shown in italics, brain regions on the lateral surface of the brain 
are shown in normal font. 
 
Abbreviations: R: (re-) actions performed by agents. MENT: The “mentalizing network” is a network of 
brain regions recruited by tests, which tap “the ability to read the desires, intentions, and beliefs of other 
people“ (e.g. Frith & Frith 2008). In line with recent meta-analyses of functional neuroimaging studies, 
which have investigated mentalizing, we see medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) and the posterior cingulate 
cortex (PPC) as the most important nodes of this network, sometimes also referred to as the “cortical 
midline structures” (e.g. Northoff & Bermpohl 2004; Schilbach et al. in press; Uddin et al. 2007). While a 
large body of literature exists to suggest that these brain regions can be differentially engaged by classical 
mental state attribution tasks (Figure 1A), much less is known about the interactions within this network 
and with other brain regions as a function of emotional engagement and social interaction (Figure 1B-D). 
MNS: As introduced in section 1 the so-called “mirror neuron system” is thought to include areas of 
inferior frontal cortex (IFC) and inferior parietal cortex (IPC) (Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia 2010). Individual 
nodes of this network are known to become active during the observation of goal-directed actions, but 
their interplay and, in particular, the interaction with MENT is not well understood (Figure 1B-D; 
Schilbach 2010). SMC: Primary sensorimotor cortex. DLPFC: Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (separate 
from MNS regions). ACC: Anterior cingulate cortex (here thought to be separate from MENT). AMY: 
Amygdala. INS: Insular cortex. LatHb: Lateral habenula complex. VTA: Ventral tegmental area. VS: 
Ventral striatum. 
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2.1.1 Constituents of a second-person approach: Emotional engagement 
A second-person grasp of other minds, we argue, is, first, closely related to feelings of 
engagement and emotional responses to the other. According to this viewpoint, awareness of 
other minds crucially hinges upon emotional engagement and a responsiveness to another 
person’s states or actions as compared to a detached observer’s attitude, which does not include 
such responding (cf. Reddy 2003, 2008; Rietveld 2008; Figure 1). Although emotional responses 
are also influenced by one’s own concerns, they constitute an important way of perceiving and 
integrating the state of the other by way of experiencing one’s own bodily responses to her (e.g. 
Prinz 2003; Figure 1B). Mentality —in this view— is thought to become meaningful as a result 
of relating new pieces of experience to a pre-existing network of experiences. On a neural level, 
emotional and embodied responses may play a crucial role in influencing action control networks 
of the brain by modulating processes of sensorimotor integration, which, in turn, solicit activity 
and observable behavior (Frijda 1986, p.469; Keltner & Haidt 1999; Schilbach et al. 2008a; 
Figure 1). Consequently, affective responses relying upon proprioceptive afferences from the 
body and action-based processes are likely to be closely linked and to interact in complex ways. 
For instance, it would seem plausible that emotional-embodied responses could facilitate more 
cognitive ways of understanding minds, while the absence of such responses could make this a 
more effortful process. Furthermore, it is important to point out that while emotional engagement 
may also occur (and could be particularly relevant) during observation (such as watching an 
emotionally charged movie scene or perceiving to be perceived by someone, Figure 1B), the 
opposite may be true for some situations, in which one actually interacts with someone (such as 
hastily buying a bus ticket from a cashier, Figure 1C). 
 
2.1.2. Constituents of a second-person approach: Social interaction 
Second, we see social interaction as a key constituent of grasping other minds. Social 
interactions are characterized by intricate reciprocal relations with the perception of socially 
relevant information prompting (re-) actions, which are themselves processed and reacted to 
(Figure 1 C & D). These reciprocities might be sequential (as depicted in the schematic of Figure 
1), but are often complex, dynamic and non-linear (Froese & Di Paolo 2010; Port & van Gelder 
1995; Thelen & Smith 1994). Being in interaction with someone, we suggest, furthermore relies 
upon a perception of the environment in terms of the resources held collectively by both 
interactors rather than those held by each individual alone (Costall 1995; Sebanz et al. 2006; 
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Richardson et al. 2007; Marsh et al. 2009; Schilbach et al., in press). In social interaction rather 
than exercising one’s deliberative reflective capacities we exercise our own practical know-how 
in dealing with others as interactors (Klin et al. 2003). Here, interaction and feedback are not only 
a way of gathering data about the other person, i.e. observing effects one may have on the other, 
but rather, as De Jaegher et al. (2010) have argued persuasively, one’s knowledge of the other 
resides —at least in part— in the interaction dynamics ‘between’ the agents. Thus, taking social 
interaction seriously suggests that there may not be an absolute epistemic gulf between self and 
other, which would make an inferential detour necessary, but rather that the dynamics of the 
social interaction contribute to and —at times— constitute our awareness of other minds (Figure 
1 C & D). 
 
There are at least three different aspects of social interaction, which are important for research in 
social neuroscience. First, interaction involves different roles for the interactors. At the simplest 
level, one can be an ‘initiator’ or a ‘responder’ in an interaction, i.e. the same (or very similar) 
action can be performed in an attempt to initiate an interaction or as a response to someone else’s 
action. Although such a simple and clear-cut difference in roles may be rare in dynamic real-time 
encounters, we believe that this distinction is important for neuroscience research, because it 
implies different motivational consequences and differences in the underlying neural processes: 
An action by an ’initiator’ may involve stronger monitoring of the outcome of the interaction, 
while an action by a ‘responder’ may involve closer attention to the emotional effects of the 
action being responded to, a difference which may be reflected in differential involvement of 
brain regions (see Figure 1). Second, shared intentions and motivations are newly created within 
interaction, with important consequences for the performance of joint actions and for the progress 
and continuation of the interaction itself. We argue that these processes are quite different from 
those involved in merely observing someone else interact, and must play a crucial role in shaping 
activity in the neural networks that underlie social cognition (see section 3 & 5 for further 
details). Third, interaction always involves historicity suggesting that social phenomena must be 
understood —at both the psychological and the neural level— within the context of the past and 
must involve developmental trajectories, which continue to be relevant throughout the life span. 
 
In order to further clarify the central notions of emotional engagement and social interaction as 
part of a second-person approach to other minds and to illustrate that this view has already begun 
  12 
to prove productive in shaping research outside the neurosciences, in what follows, we will draw 
on and review evidence from the fields of developmental, social and cognitive psychology. 
 
 
2.2.1 Developing awareness of minds through second-person engagements: Evidence from 
developmental psychology 
Debates in developmental psychology concerned with the processes through which infants and 
young children come to recognize the existence and nature of other minds reflect the same 
assumptions that have beset the traditional philosophical debates. They have most often posited 
two sources of information for the developing child —that of first-person experience and third-
person observation— or on occasion an unconvincing amalgam of the two. The possibility of a 
difference in awareness in different relations with specific ‘other minds’ —which is the central 
assumption of a second-person approach to mind knowledge (Reddy 2003, 2008)— was either 
neglected or explicitly denied (Barresi & Moore 1996). There has, however, been a dramatic 
surge of interest in second-person explanations within development (e.g. Carpendale & Lewis 
2004; Gallagher 2001; Hobson 1991, 1999; Reddy 1996, 2003, 2008). 
 
Evidence for the second-person argument, namely that an appropriate development of awareness 
of other minds depends on the infant first experiencing minds which are directed towards her, is 
scattered throughout the developmental psychological literature. Probably the most impressive 
evidence of infants’ sensitivity to and preference for the infant-directedness of interpersonal 
actions comes from recent studies concerning early responses to gaze. Mutual gaze both reflects 
one organism’s interest in another’s gaze and signals this interest to the other, with the potential 
for creating a situation of intense mutuality. Between two and five days of birth, human neonates 
show a preference for looking at faces or pictures of faces with eyes directly looking towards the 
infant. This preference reveals itself both in terms of longer looking times and in terms of more 
frequent looks (Farroni et al. 2002). Even earlier than this, within minutes of birth, infants show 
considerable interest in and respond appropriately to self-directed facial actions, primarily more 
noticeable actions such as tongue protrusion and opening the mouth wide (Kugiumutzakis 1998; 
Meltzoff & Moore 1977; Nagy & Molnar 2004). Also, there is evidence that by four months of 
age the experimenter’s gaze directed toward rather than away from the infant leads to a variety of 
neural reactions and information processing advantages: higher cortical arousal (Farroni et al. 
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2002), enhanced occipital early gamma response (Grossman et al. 2007), enhanced neural 
processing of emotional expressions (Striano et al. 2006), facilitated neural processing of objects 
(Reid et al. 2004), and differential processing of words (Parise et al. 2008). By two months of age 
infants already show a variety of emotional reactions to attention directed to the self, ranging 
from pleasure (Wolff 1987) to distress if unable to disengage (Brazelton 1986) to ambivalence in 
the form of coy smiles (Reddy 2000). A large number of studies have shown that the intricacies 
of emotional engagement matter from very early infancy and are the source of meaning about self 
and others. Two- to three-month-olds during face-to-face communication demonstrate intra- and 
interpersonal coordination (Fogel 1993; Lavelli & Fogel 2002; Stern 1985; Trevarthen 1977), are 
disturbed by the lack of temporal and affective coordination (Cohn & Tronick 1989; Legerstee & 
Varghese 2001; Murray & Trevarthen 1985; Nadel & Tremblay-Leveay 1999), are affected in 
their ability to bid for attention by the history of maternal affective responses (McQuaid et al. 
2009) and learn to prefer the levels of interactional contingency they are familiar with (Bigelow 
& Rochat 2006). 
 
Infant awareness of attention in second-person engagements has been argued to have 
developmental primacy over the awareness of attention in triadic and more temporally extended 
attentional engagements (Reddy 2003, 2005, 2008). Evidence for the causal role of such 
engagements in developing triadic and more complex reflective awareness comes from 
developmental psychopathology (particularly autism) where problems with explicit social 
cognition (at the level of triadic joint attention or at the level of concepts of self or of other) are 
heralded by problems in second-person engagements (with establishing mutual attention and 
mutual responsiveness with self and with other; Leekam & Ramsden 2006; Reddy et al. 2010; 
Reddy, in press). 
 
The primacy of second-person engagements creates serious conceptual and methodological 
problems for psychological research: it demands that emotion be taken as central to an awareness 
of minds and focuses on emotional responses rather than reflections or constructs. We argue that 
such experiences of mind and mentality are first and most intensely experienced within second-
person engagements, where the individual is directly addressed by and responds to an ‘other’ 
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mind. Such second-person experiences of other minds, we argue, are necessary for the typical 
development of social understanding and continue to influence social understanding throughout 
life. 
 
2.2.2 Knowing Minds in Interaction: Evidence from social and cognitive psychology 
In social psychology and related fields —in spite of a long history and interest in “social 
presence” effects (e.g. Allport 1924; Biocca et al. 2003; Short et al. 1976; Triplett 1898; 
Worringham & Messick 1983; Zajonc 1965)— the need to allow test subjects to leave the 
“experimental quarantine” of “isolation paradigms” when studying social processes has only 
recently been recognized (e.g. Becchio et al. 2010; Richardson et al. 2007; Sebanz et al. 2006). 
This development appears to be based on the assumption that cognition is grounded in basic 
perception and action processes and emerges out of the interaction of the organism with its 
environment and that —rather than treating it as an experimental confound— a social context and 
social interaction can be treated as an independent variable of experimentation. Consistent with 
this proposal, the second-person approach sees interaction with other agents and the ensuing 
interaction dynamics as crucial for the knowing of other minds and the expression of that 
knowledge. 
 
The role of social interaction for cognitive and social development has begun to gain centre stage 
in various scientific discourses (De Jaegher et al. 2010): The role of interaction as a vehicle for 
the acquisition of knowledge has for instance been demonstrated in language development. In 
contrast to the Chomskian idea of a “Language Acquisition Device” (e.g. Chomsky 1979), the 
perception of structure in social interactions has been shown to guide vocal development and 
language learning (Bruner 1983; Goldstein & Schwade 2010), both in terms of speech perception 
(Kuhl 2007a,b; Kuhl et al. 2003) or turn-taking (Goldstein & Schwade 2008; Goldstein et al. 
2009; Jaffe et al. 2001). Whereas children can extract statistical regularities from any structured 
material without awareness or intention using mere error feedback (Marcus et al. 1999; Saffran et 
al. 1997), observation of one's own behavioral outcomes in interaction may be crucial for such 
learning to occur (Goldstein et al. 2010). Adults also coordinate turn-taking, implicitly agree 
upon names for objects (Brennan & Clark 1996; Brennan & Hanna 2009), approach each other's 
accents (Giles et al. 1992), sway their body in synchrony (Shockley et al. 2003), and visually 
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coordinate their attention through synchronized eye movements (Richardson et al. 2007) 
suggesting that communication may be grounded by a shared context, which is actively 
developed in ongoing encounters (Clark 1996; Garrod & Pickering 2004). 
 
In other areas of research “interaction” has been investigated by focusing on processes such as 
involuntary mimicry (e.g. Chartrand & Bargh 1999; Konvalinka et al. 2010; Niedenthal et al. 
2010; Schmidt et al. 1990), which leads to enhanced rapport and liking, but is also influenced by 
differences in affiliative motives and interdependent self-construal (Van Baaren et al. 2003, 
2004). Social interaction, however, normally also involves more complex forms of coordination 
present from early on in life (cf. Harrist & Waugh 2002). In this respect, Knoblich & Sebanz 
(2008) distinguish between “action simulation” (see also Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia 2010), “joint 
attention” and “shared intentionality” (see also Tomasello & Carpenter 2007). The development 
of a shared perceptual and attentional space within early mutual attentional engagements is 
crucial, since it paves the way for triadic interactions, in which we share our mental states about a 
third object or person with the other (Tomasello 1995). In turn, such triadic attentional 
engagements may be crucial for developing complex joint actions (Fiebich & Gallagher, in press; 
Knoblich & Sebanz 2008; Richardson et al. 2007; Sebanz et al. 2006). 
 
In spite of a growing interest in this matter, the bulk of research is still rooted in a mechanistic 
metaphor of feedback loops that inform individuals about the adequacy of their behavior. In this 
framework, it is assumed that the sum of two interacting agents can be expressed in terms of 
processes ‘within’ those agents (however, modified by the external world, in this case each 
other). We argue that interaction expresses a type of knowledge of other minds that is not entirely 
reducible to knowledge ‘inside’ any two individual agents but exists “between” them (see De 
Jaegher et al. 2010). Interestingly, the recently developed “perceptual crossing paradigm” directly 
addresses this aspect (Auvray et al. 2009; Lenay et al. 2011): here, two participants interact with 
each other by moving their mouse cursor in a one-dimensional virtual space. In this space they 
can encounter three different types of objects indicated by tactile stimulation: a fixed object, a 
constantly moving object, and the other participant. Their task is to click the mouse only if they 
believe to have encountered the other person’s cursor. Thus, it is only when they meet each other, 
that both are stimulated simultaneously. Using this setup, it was shown that healthy volunteers 
exhibit a dissociation between task performance and awareness of this performance with respect 
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to the detection of reciprocity (though not with respect to the detection of animacy): conscious 
identification of the other person (by means of clicks) is limited to distinguishing both moving 
objects from the fixed object (animacy detection), but does not extend to distinguishing the 
moving object from the other person's object (reciprocity detection). However, participants' 
interaction dynamics allow us to distinguish not only between fixed and moving objects, but also 
between the moving object and the other's cursor (Auvray et al. 2009). Crucially, this 
demonstrates that unrelated to awareness and strategic processes, people are sensitive to 
reciprocal interaction, and furthermore spontaneously engage in mutual modification of action 
patterns with an interactor, actively “seeking the other out”. It is only in this interactive process 
that contingencies are simultaneously experienced and acted upon. 
 
Taken together, recent progress in developmental, social and cognitive psychology indicates a 
surge of interest in emotional engagement and real-time social interaction as key constituents for 
knowing other minds. While, in fact, this second-person approach has already begun to prove 
productive in shaping experimental work, this has occurred largely outside the realm of 
neuroscience. We suggest that the approach promises to do the same within the field of social 
neuroscience, thereby leading to the establishment of a second-person neuroscience. 
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3. Toward a second-person neuroscience 
After more than a decade of successful research, ‘dark matter’ remains in the field of social 
neuroscience (Figure 2). As highlighted above previous research has often focused on the 
perception of inert stimuli —consistent with the idea of a detached observer— whereas, in 
everyday life, making sense of others requires both emotional engagement and interaction 
(Figure 1). Consequently, a second-person neuroscience will help to address differences in the 
neurobiological underpinnings of social knowing related to 
 
i) a person being a detached observer as compared to experiencing a social situation with an 
attitude of emotional engagement (Figure 2: ‘experience’) 
ii) experimental paradigms used to investigate social cognition allowing or not allowing for 
interaction (Figure 2: ‘participation’)2 
iii) data collection and analysis taking place at the level of a single or two (or more) individuals 
(Figure 2: ‘data collection & analysis’)3. 
 
In the following we will review evidence from neuroimaging and psychophysiology to 
demonstrate the relevance and applicability of the first and second dimension of our conception 
of a second-person grasp of other minds (section 3.1). Additionally, we will discuss some of the 
methodological challenges associated with addressing the third dimension and other important 
milestones in the development of a second-person neuroscience (section 3.2). 
                                                
2  Here, it is important to note that from a conceptual point of view we do not see the differences between the 
dimensions of ‘experience’ and ‘participation’, as being strictly categorical in nature. Also, it is important to 
emphasize that we are, here, referring to the characteristics of experimental paradigms, which do (or do not) elicit a 
sense of emotional engagement and which allow (or do not allow) a human subject to participate in social 
interaction. 
 
3  From our perspective, making experimental paradigms more interactive and ecologically valid will allow 
assessing differences in the neural correlates of social cognition from an observer’s as compared to from an 
interactor’s point of view in an individual’s brain (see Figure 1). In addition to that, however, another important 
question will be to investigate whether more insights can be gleaned from quantifying inter-brain effects of social 
interactions and to assess whether two interacting brains provide more information about the interaction than the sum 
of the individual brains (e.g. Hasson et al. 2012; see also Section 3.2.2). 
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Figure 2. Depiction of the experimental ‘landscape’ of a second-person neuroscience. 
Cubes shown in this figure represent categories of experimental approaches to the investigation of social 
cognition in accordance with the second-person account. Here, we highlight cubes 1-5, which in 
accordance with the text are most informative as to the different aspects of the research landscape: Cube 
[1], e.g. represents studies, which target differences between detached observation as compared to 
emotional engagement (see section 3.1.1). Cube [2] represents studies which use paradigms that allow the 
participant to directly influence the stimulus material, i.e. seeing the effect of her actions (e.g. interactive 
eyetracking studies; see section 3.1.2). Cube [3] represents studies that collect data from two participants 
who interact by means of a structured task, including hyperscanning studies that e.g. make use of game 
theory paradigms (see section 3.2.1). Cubes [4] and [5] represent studies which allow for the investigation 
of ecologically valid, real-time interactions (see 3.2.2). More intense shades of grey indicate areas of the 
landscape, which have been left largely unexplored, representing the ‘dark matter’ of social neuroscience. 
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3.1 Preliminary evidence from functional neuroimaging and psychophysiology 
 
3.1.1 Being Addressed as You: The neurobiological correlates of emotional engagement 
Based on the hypothesis of differences in the neural processing of social stimuli depending upon 
whether or not they are directed toward oneself as compared to being directed toward someone 
else, we performed a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study (Schilbach et al. 
2006), in which participants were asked to imagine being part of a scenario with three others, 
only one of which being visible (Figure 3A), and were shown short video sequences depicting 
this virtual character, which exhibited socially relevant facial expressions or arbitrary facial 
movements. Furthermore, it was varied whether or not the virtual character looked directly at the 
participant (Figure 3B) or towards the right or left in the direction of an invisible agent (Figure 
3C). Participants were asked to rate in all cases whether they felt that the virtual character had 
expressed an intention to initiate a social interaction. 
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Figure 3. A) Virtual scenario as shown in the instructions. B) Self-directed, socially relevant facial 
expression. C) Other-directed, arbitrary facial movement. D) Neural correlates of the perception of self-
directed facial expressions. E) Neural correlates of the perception of other-directed facial expressions. F) 
Neural correlates of the perception of arbitrary facial movements. Activation overlays based on reanalysis 
of data taken from: Schilbach et al. (2006). 
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The behavioral results demonstrated that participants did not have difficulties in differentiating 
socially relevant from arbitrary mimic behavior. Interestingly and in spite of the explicit 
instruction to “put themselves into the shoes of the other”, participants demonstrated a bias 
towards giving socially relevant facial expressions a significantly higher rating when they were 
self-directed. In parallel to this, results of the neuroimaging analysis demonstrated significant 
differences in activation patterns subserving the perception of socially relevant facial expressions 
depending upon whether these expressions were self- or other-directed: while self-directed facial 
expressions led to a differential increase of neural activity in the ventral portion of MPFC and the 
(superficial) AMY (Figure 3D), other-directed facial expressions resulted in a differential 
recruitment of medial and lateral parietal cortex (Figure 3E). Our findings, therefore, demonstrate 
that while the perception of socially relevant nonverbal cues from an observer’s point of view 
recruits brain regions that have been related to visuo-spatial processing, the perception of 
identical, self-directed stimuli activate brain regions that have been related to emotional and 
evaluative processing (Schilbach et al. 2006). 
 
Indeed, the AMY is known to be a crucial subcortical hub of the limbic system serving various 
integrative sensory and emotional functions in attaching biological and social significance to 
stimuli (Gamer & Buchel 2009; Gamer et al. 2010; Muscatell et al. 2010; N'Diaye et al. 2009; 
Tamietto & de Gelder 2010). The ventral portion of MPFC is also known to be relevant for 
emotional processing and has been implicated to be involved in “outcome monitoring” (Amodio 
& Frith 2006). More generally, emotions are known to be an important driving force for 
interpersonal behavior and a ‘short hand’ that guides decision-making processes (e.g. Frijda 
1986; Damasio 2010). Also, emotions are assumed to be of crucial importance for interpersonal 
perception by allowing the observer to share the feeling state of another individual (Preston & de 
Waal 2002). Apart from this traditional view of how emotions might contribute to social 
cognition, our account views emotional responses not only as a way of perceiving emotional 
states in others, but also as a way of being engaged with others, which could contribute to the 
understanding of the bodily intentionality of the other in terms of bodily responsiveness (Rietveld 
2008). Being responsive to the socially relevant, expressive behavior of others in this way could 
provide and bias possibilities for (inter-) action by motivating behavior and soliciting activity. 
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Interestingly, our neuroimaging analysis also demonstrated that the perception of arbitrary facial 
movements recruited the right inferior frontal and inferior parietal cortices (Figure 1 & 3F). 
These brain regions are commonly described as important nodes of the MNS, which has been 
related to understanding the (motor) intentions that underlie others’ actions (Rizzolatti & 
Sinigaglia 2010). This finding, we think, is interesting in several respects: first of all, it suggests 
that activity in the MNS is not related to the particular perspective a human observer adopts, but 
more closely tracks the observed behavior itself regardless of whether it is ‘my action’ or ‘your 
action’. This seems to be consistent with the dominant interpretation of MNS activity in the 
literature suggesting that the MNS may have evolved to represent actions in the same way across 
subjects and that mirror neurons explain the ability to understand other minds by giving us a 
“first-person grasp” of the motor goals and intentions of other individuals (Rizzolatti & 
Sinigaglia 2010). This view has, however, been criticized as over-emphasizing similarities in 
self- and other-related processes (Schilbach 2010) and under-representing the important question 
of where mirror neurons actually ‘come from’ (Heyes 2010). Here, an important suggestion has 
been that mirror neurons may only play a role in situations when the action and its stereotypic 
context are highly familiar (e.g. Brass et al. 2007). In our study, however, brain regions described 
as corresponding to the MNS, respond more strongly to arbitrary facial movements than to 
socially relevant ones, which appears to contradict the idea that the MNS only plays a role in 
familiar situations. On the contrary, an arbitrary facial movement – with which one may be less 
familiar than with socially relevant facial expressions, which are directed towards another person 
more frequently - also leads to the recruitment of the MNS. This finding could be understood in 
terms of a prediction error signal (Pelphrey et al. 2003; Schippers & Keysers 2011) and could be 
relevant to associative learning processes recently discussed as an alternative account of the 
development and modulation of activity in the MNS (Heyes 2010). 
 
In fact, according to the “associative hypothesis” (Heyes 2010), mirror neurons are forged 
through sensorimotor experience of observing and executing actions and the MNS, even in 
adulthood, can be reconfigured through sensorimotor learning. Evidence for this comes from a 
series of elegant studies, which demonstrate that sensorimotor experience can enhance (Press et 
al. 2007), abolish (Heyes et al. 2005) and even reverse (Catmur et al. 2007, 2008) ‘mirror’ 
activation in human participants. Consistently, a recent simulation study demonstrated that a 
reinforcement learning based model could account for the development of mirror neurons in gaze 
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following (Triesch et al. 2007). With respect to the possible sources of sensorimotor experience 
that may impact on the MNS, Heyes (2010) has recently emphasized that much of this experience 
is obtained through interaction with others. We strongly support this position and argue that the 
investigation of action observation and execution in a more ecologically valid, interpersonal 
context —as suggested by a second-person neuroscience— will help to investigate these matters 
further (cf. Kourtis et al. 2010). More specifically, we see a role for the MNS beyond mere motor 
resonance: rather than suggesting that mirror neuron activity constitutes a simulation routine 
which gives us a “first-person grasp” of the other (Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia 2010), we contend that 
an understanding of the MNS on the enactive view of cognition would suggest that activity in 
these regions might be more closely related to the ability to perceive social affordances, i.e. the 
possibilities for interaction provided by others, in terms of an activation of motor programs that 
could allow for interpersonal coordination of behavior (cf. Gangopadhyay & Schilbach, in press). 
This view is consistent with the idea of social interactions having a profound impact on MNS 
activity and offers a more plausible account for actions that people perform jointly as these often 
involve complementary or incongruent actions rather than imitative or congruent ones (cf. Fuchs 
& De Jaegher 2009; Gallagher 2007). Indeed, a recent study by Newman-Norlund and colleagues 
(2007) found evidence that the MNS is more active during the preparation of complementary 
actions while other studies demonstrate that activity in the human MNS can be modulated by 
social interaction (Kourtis et al. 2010; Oberman et al. 2007). This is clearly in line with our 
suggestion that an essential aspect of apprehending other minds lies in the kinds of responses 
their activity elicits (see Figure 1). 
 
In a follow-up experiment to our fMRI study, the paradigm was used while recording eye-
movements, pupil size and facial electromyography (EMG). The results show that attention 
allocation, as assessed by fixation duration, was specifically related to the perception of self-
directed stimuli. EMG measurements demonstrated that facial activity was influenced by the 
perception of socially relevant facial expressions, demonstrating spontaneous, involuntary facial 
responses that have been described as “facial mimicry” (Mojzisch et al. 2006). While we did not 
observe a statistically significant interaction effect here, the difference in EMG activity between 
self- and other-directed facial expressions was noteworthy (see Schilbach et al. 2008a, for 
details). Using the temporal information from the EMG study, we re-analyzed the fMRI data to 
investigate the neural correlates of facial mimicry. This analysis identified a network comprising 
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the face region of the primary motor cortex, but also the posterior cingulate cortex, hippocampus 
and the dorsal midbrain. This is suggestive of a close link between the perception of facial 
expressions and their generation in the observer. Facial expressions might be particularly prone to 
engaging such mechanisms as they serve important communicative functions. Furthermore these 
findings demonstrate that situations which lead to emotional engagement and invite an element of 
a motor response, recruit both fronto-parietal areas as well as the cortical midline structures and 
differentially activate the limbic system of the brain (Schilbach et al. 2008a; cf. Buck et al. 1992; 
see Figure 1). 
 
Taken together, the results of these studies demonstrate significant differences in the 
neurobiological mechanisms of the perception of facial expressions depending upon emotional 
engagement. When we are personally addressed by others, the perception of their mimic behavior 
relis, in neurobiological terms, upon tight perception-action coupling with affective and body-
based processing feeding into and promoting the preparation of motor responses as a way of 
picking up and responding to the possibilities for interaction. 
 
 
3.1.2 Minds made for sharing: The neurobiological correlates of the reciprocity of social 
interaction 
As outlined above, interaction loops must be considered as important constituents of second-
person relations. Thus, within social interaction, interactors mutually and directly influence each 
other and may hold different roles during the interaction (as introduced in section 2.1; see Figure 
1 C & D). To establish a paradigm that allows participants to be part of a social interaction in the 
constrained fMRI setting, we have developed a novel technique that makes use of eyetracking 
data obtained from participants inside the scanner to control a virtual character’s gaze behavior in 
real-time making it ‘responsive’ to the human observer’s gaze (Wilms et al. 2010). This setup, 
therefore, allows participants to experience their own eye-movements to have an effect on the 
gaze behavior of a (virtual) other similar to how this occurs in real-life situations. Importantly, 
such a setup can allow the investigation of cognitive phenomena which are at the interface of 
automatic and controlled processes, as eye-movements are known to be closely related to both 
(e.g. Hikosaka & Isoda 2010). Also, the setup allows us to investigate phenomena whose 
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emergence necessarily depends upon social interaction, its reciprocity and whose underlying 
psychological processes and neural mechanisms may differ depending upon the roles interactors 
hold during interaction, namely those of being ‘initiator’ or ‘responder’ in the interaction. 
 
With respect to the phenomenon of joint attention, i.e. attending to something together with 
someone and being aware that ‘we both’ are attending, the latter appears to be highly relevant: 
joint attention can occur either as a result of following someone else’s gaze toward an object 
(‘responder’) or as a result of directing someone else’s gaze toward the object (‘initiator’). 
Clinically, children with autism, in fact, show less pronounced impairments in their ability to 
respond to a person’s gaze shifts (by following the gaze) than in their spontaneous drive to 
initiate the sharing of attention (by trying to make someone look at something; Mundy & Newell 
2007). 
 
Based on the hypothesis that differences in the neural basis of joint attention could be related to 
the reciprocity of social interaction (as compared to previous social neuroscience attempts to 
investigate the neural correlates of joint attention by means of tasks in which participants are 
mere observers of gaze cues (e.g. Williams et al. 2005; Materna et al. 2008; see also section 2.1), 
the setup described above was used to perform an fMRI study, in which participants interacted 
with the virtual other while undergoing neuroimaging (Schilbach et al. 2010a). Experimental 
variations consisted of initiating vs. following the gaze of the virtual character when fixating 
objects shown on the stimulus screen (Figure 4A). Our results demonstrate the recruitment of 
MPFC and PCC for joint attention to an object, regardless of whether or not this was initiated by 
the participant or the (virtual) other (Figure 4B). Conversely, looking at an object different from 
the one inspected by the virtual other led to the recruitment of a lateralized fronto-parietal 
network (Figure 4C). While the latter closely resembles the neural network which has been 
related to the control of attention and eye-movements (Corbetta et al. 2008; Pierrot-Deseilligny et 
al. 2004), the former regions closely match those which have been described as belonging to the 
MENT (Frith & Frith 2006; Kampe et al. 2003) while overlapping with others that have become 
known as the “default mode of brain function” (Raichle et al. 2001; Schilbach et al. 2008b; 
Schilbach et al. in press).
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Figure 4. A) Screenshot depicting an anthropomorphic virtual character and three objects (grey squares). 
B) Neural correlates of main effect of joint attention. C) Neural correlates of non-joint attention. D) 
Neural correlates of other-initiated joint attention. E) Neural correlates of self-initiated joint attention. 
Activation overlays based on a reanalysis of data taken from: Schilbach et al. (2010a). 
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In spite of participants always fixating an object on the stimulus screen, the underlying brain 
activity appears to be markedly different depending upon whether or not the participant is doing 
this ‘together’ with a virtual other or not. Doing so in coordination with the virtual character 
resulted in a differential increase of neural activity in a network whose activity has been related 
to the human ability for grasping another person’s mental states, her communicative intentions 
and for using an internally oriented mode of cognizing to contextualize aspects of a situation 
(Amodio & Frith 2006; Bar 2007; Buckner & Carroll 2006; Kampe et al. 2003; Schilbach et al. 
2008b). Here, it is important to stress that the MENT was activated as a result of participants 
simply and naturally coordinating their gaze with that of the other without any explicit instruction 
to assess the mental states of the virtual other. This is consistent with the observation of 
activations of dorsal MPFC when study participants were addressed by their first names or by 
faces looking directly at them (Kampe et al. 2003). Our findings, therefore, seem to contradict the 
proposal that the mentalizing network is responsible for reflective and more explicit social 
cognition (Keysers & Gazzola 2007). In essence, we are able to show that this network is 
activated as a result of interpersonal coordination in social interaction, which was also 
experienced as more pleasant and less effortful than doing the opposite of what the virtual 
character was doing (cf. Schnell et al. 2011). Follow-up studies using modifications of our novel 
paradigm will investigate putative connectivity differences between areas of the MENT during 
social interaction and observation and will explore how a cooperative or competitive context 
influences the neural mechanisms of a gaze-based interaction (Figure 1; see sections 3.2 and 5 for 
further details). 
 
Our findings, therefore, raise the intriguing possibility that activity changes in the MENT can 
occur as a result of (gaze-based) social interaction (cf. Allen & Williams 2011). To us it is 
tempting to think of this finding as paralleling the suggestions of Heyes (2010) with respect to the 
MNS, giving rise to the hypothesis that similar associative mechanisms might play a role in the 
case of the MENT. In a similar line of thought, Behrens and colleagues have demonstrated that 
social prediction error signals —when learning from the behavior of or advice provided by 
others— are coded by MENT components, which they describe as evidence for the argument that 
higher-order social cognitive mechanisms may rely on simple associative processes (Behrens, 
Hunt & Rushworth 2009). Crucially, the elegant computational approach taken by Behrens and 
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colleagues to investigate reward-based learning and decision-making uses a generative model, 
allowing the consideration of the learning history to predict changes in neural activity over time. 
Similarly, we suggest, future research in social neuroscience should investigate the development 
and changes in neural networks, i.e. the neural plasticity related to and induced by real-time 
social interactions, thereby helping to understand how particular functions actually develop in 
particular areas of the brain or brains of interactors (cf. Westermann et al. 2007; see Figure 1 and 
section 5 for more details). 
 
Furthermore, our neuroimaging finding of a differential increase of neural activity in the MENT 
is particularly relevant, because it is observed during joint attention: Ontogenetically, joint 
attention is known to be a most important precursor of explicit social cognitive abilities and 
predates these conceptual abilities by years: A recent study was, indeed, able to show that 
children have an implicit ‘know how’ of what others experience long before passing false-belief 
tasks, when they encounter them in joint engagement (Moll et al. 2007). Based on our findings, it 
can be assumed that joint attention in social interaction already relies upon the brain regions of 
the MENT before children pass tasks that require an explicit knowledge of others’ mental states 
(cf. Grossmann & Johnson 2010). Rather than being a network that is exclusively devoted to 
reflective social cognition, this network might, therefore, be trained up by participation in social 
interaction in terms of basic mechanisms which allow the use of analogies and associations to 
generate predictions (Friston 2008; Mitchell 2009). During later stages in development this 
network may then be brought into the service of explicit social cognition (Frith & Frith 2008), 
which —at the level of the brain— could be reflected in differences in the functional or effective 
connectivity between individual brain regions, rather than functionally segregated effects (e.g. 
Sporns et al. 2004; Daunizeau et al. 2010a,b). In these terms, the progression from perceiving and 
being motivated to respond to relevant social stimuli to understanding them may be a result of 
the matching of top-down and bottom-up expectations. Importantly, bi-directional relationships 
between different levels of neural processing may remain relevant throughout life (Teufel et al. 
2010; see Figure 1). 
 
Returning to the results of the fMRI study on joint attention, it is of crucial importance that 
differences in the neural correlates were also observed depending upon joint attention being self- 
or other-initiated: while following someone else’s gaze to engage in joint attention resulted in the 
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recruitment of the anterior portion of MPFC (aMPFC; Figure 4D) known to be involved in the 
enhancement of stimulus-oriented attending (Burgess et al. 2007), directing someone else’s gaze 
towards an object activated the ventral striatum (VS), part of the functional neuroanatomy of 
reward processing (Figure 4E). In light of ratings of subjective experience also obtained from 
participants during a post-scan questionnaire —which indicated that they enjoyed looking at 
objects more ‘together with’ the virtual other— the latter finding, indeed, appeared to be related 
to the hedonic aspects of experiencing self-initiated joint attention (Schilbach et al. 2010a). This 
seems to be in line with the idea that social interaction may involve collaborative and affiliative 
motives, the realization of which is experienced as rewarding, possibly relying upon an ‘intrinsic’ 
motivation of humans for sharing of experiences (Tomasello 2009; Trevarthen 1980). 
Furthermore, these findings demonstrate how basic motivation- or reward-related signals may 
play a key role in the establishment and maintenance of social relations (e.g. Panksepp et al. 
1980), which appears to be a crucial area for future research in social neuroscience (see section 
5.2 for further details). Most importantly, our results provide clear evidence that the neural 
circuitry used during social interaction differs from the circuitry recruited during ‘individual’ 
social cognition when one’s behavior does not have effects on the ‘object’ of one’s cognition (cf. 
Schilbach et al. 2010a; Williams et al. 2005; Materna et al. 2008). 
 
 
3.2 Methods for a Second-Person Neuroscience 
Advancing research in social neuroscience as suggested by a second-person approach requires 
both upon a refinement of conceptual issues, the derivation of concrete hypotheses as well as the 
development of adequate methods to address these questions. It is to the discussion of the latter 
that we turn in the following section. Concrete ideas for experiments based upon our conception 
of the constituents of a second-person approach as outlined in section 2 are discussed in detail in 
section 4. 
 
3.2.1 Top-down and bottom-up investigations of social interaction 
In the joint attention paradigm, participants interact with anthropomorphic virtual characters, who 
they believe are controlled by other human participants (Wilms et al. 2010). In this paradigm, we 
are in a position to investigate the behavioral and neural correlates of interaction contingencies 
and responses that are characteristic of various forms of social encounters (Figure 1 & 2). Future 
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studies will make use of this setup to explore the interaction of explicit and implicit processes in 
social cognition and how this may depend upon being able to ‘get into the action’. Here, one 
could specifically ask whether the difference between social cognition from an interactor’s as 
compared to an observer’s point of view merely adds an action component or whether this 
actually changes other psychological processes. In terms of the underlying neural substrates such 
differences might be characterizable in terms of overlapping versus distinct neurocircuits or could 
be related to differences in connectivity between ‘social brain’ regions (Figure 1). Also, the 
question could be addressed whether ostensive cues exchanged between interactors (e.g. mutual 
gaze; Csibra & Gergely 2009) are equally effective from an observer’s point of view as compared 
to situations when one is personally addressed. 
 
Furthermore, paradigms are being developed in our laboratory, which will help to understand 
differences between social cognition from an interactor’s as compared to an observer’s point of 
view with respect to reward-based interactions (cf. Pessoa & Engelmann 2010). Based on the 
assumption that social interaction per se may be experienced as motivating and rewarding, it 
appears plausible to devise paradigms that implement a social context, in which task performance 
may be modulated depending upon whether or not the motivation to interact socially is 
parallelized with or contrasted with performing the task (see section 5.1.1 for further details). 
Another extension of the above described joint attention paradigm could consist in using virtual 
characters whose facial expressions and whole-body movements could also be manipulated. This 
setup would allow the investigation of how participant-directed gaze behavior of the virtual 
character would influence the perception of, for instance, reaching or grasping movements in 
peri- and extrapersonal space (cf. Caggiano et al. 2009). Here, an interesting possibility would be 
to parametrically vary the degree to which a virtual character is responsive to a human observer’s 
gaze in real time to investigate how this may lead to differential recruitment of the MNS and 
MENT of the brain (Brass et al. 2007; de Lange et al. 2008; Wheatley, Milleville & Martin 2007; 
Santos et al. 2010). Also, the presentation of real-world objects that can be attended to both by 
the virtual character and the participant could be helpful to manipulate neural activity in those 
large-scale neural networks. 
 
Another fundamental question for a second-person neuroscience —closely related to the 
‘problem’ of other minds— consists in asking which factors actually determine that we perceive 
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an interaction as an exchange with a mindful rather than a machine-driven agent? To this end, a 
“nonverbal Turing test” can be devised, in which participants engage in gaze-based interaction 
with an anthropomorphic virtual character, whose gaze behavior is either controlled by another 
participant or by a computer (Figure 2; Pfeiffer et al., in press). These investigations are likely to 
be informative with respect to the impact of valence (whether or not an interaction subjectively 
feels positive or rewarding) as compared to contingency (the degree to which the virtual character 
objectively follows or does not follow one’s gaze). Furthermore one can address the question of 
the congruency of the behavior shown by the virtual character during the interaction, i.e. whether 
following or not following the participant’s gaze has an impact on ratings of sympathy and 
trustworthiness as well as subsequently evoked prosocial behavior shown towards the person one 
has interacted with. 
 
3.2.2 From interaction loops to interaction dynamics 
In the early years of social neuroscience attempts had already been made to investigate two brains 
in interaction through “hyperscanning”, hailed as a break-through technology, (Montague et al. 
2002). While the application of this method has, indeed, provided invaluable insights into the 
neural basis of social cognition in conditions of health and pathology (e.g. King-Casas et al. 
2005, 2008), the approach never really caught on. At least in part this is due to the fact that using 
it to its full potential would have required establishing more ecologically valid ways for two or 
more participants to interact (cf. Redcay et al. 2010). Most hyperscanning studies, however, have 
relied upon experimental paradigms from game theory, which allow for a highly structured, tit-
for-tat kind of interaction. The latter can be elegantly formalized mathematically, but can also be 
criticized for not recreating the interaction dynamics of everyday-life social encounters. Also, 
paradigms from game theory are deeply entrenched in a cognitivist view of the subject as a 
(rather) rational and (rather) passive recipient of information, which may not fully capture many 
aspects of naturalistic social interaction, including the ways in which interactors co-regulate their 
behavior (cf. Bacharach 2006; Hertwig & Erev 2009; Schonberg, Fox & Poldrack 2011). 
 
However, first steps are now being taken to realize the investigation of the neural mechanisms of 
interaction dynamics (Figure 2: cubes [4] & [5]). Similar to our approach of using gaze behavior 
to allow for direct social interaction (Schilbach et al. 2010a; Wilms et al. 2010), the recent work 
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of Saito and colleagues (2010) capitalizes on the idea that inter-subject synchronization at the 
neural level might occur during eye contact. Using a similarly minimalist and yet naturalistic 
setup allows the experimental control of bandwidth, i.e. the degree of complexity of the 
interaction, which may be helpful in focusing on its temporal dynamics (cf. Auvray et al. 2009). 
For their ground-breaking study Saito et al. have devised a setup in which they not only use 
hyper-scanning, but also allow participants to interact in real-time by exchanging gaze behavior. 
To this end two MRI scanners were equipped with infrared eyetracking systems and video 
cameras. Thereby a live video image of the respective interaction partner’s face could be 
broadcast into the respective other scanner to generate a mediated face-to-face situation (Figure 
5). 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Illustration of the combined hyperscanning & dual eyetracking setup used by Saito and 
colleagues (Taken from: Saito et al. 2010). 
 
 
In a simple task, participants were instructed to either look at (or away from) targets (blue or red 
balls) when a change in color indicated to do so or to follow (or not follow) the interactor’s gaze 
toward a target. Using this setup for neuroimaging purposes, it was shown that “paired” subjects 
showed higher correlations than “non-paired” subjects in an area of the MNS as assessed by 
performing an inter-brain correlation analysis of the blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) 
signal time courses as a measure of functional connectivity. Future investigations could use 
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measures of effective connectivity to systematically explore both models of eye-movement 
control as well as measures of inter-brain synchronization (e.g. Schippers et al. 2010; Anders et 
al. 2011). While we appreciate that the exploratory study by Saito et al. had to rely on a highly 
structured task, we see a significant number of possibilities for modifying and extending the 
paradigm and ingenious setup used by the authors. 
 
Indeed, it is only very recently that researchers in social neuroscience have moved on to 
investigate (relatively) unconstrained real-time social interaction while measuring neural activity 
in both interactors (Figure 1 C & D; Figure 2: cube [5]): Dumas and colleagues (2010) set out to 
investigate the inter-brain correlates of mutual adaptation processes in social interaction by 
recording with a dual-video and dual-EEG setup while interactors were asked to spontaneously 
imitate each other’s hand movements. Results demonstrated that states of “interactional 
synchrony”, i.e. states during which the hands of the two participants started and ended a 
movement simultaneously, correlate with a synchronized inter-brain network in the alpha-mu 
band in centro-parietal cortex. Interestingly, the alpha-mu band has been considered as an 
electrophysiological correlate of MNS functioning and specific frequencies of this band have 
been discussed as a marker of social coordination (Tognoli et al. 2007). 
 
Against this background, we posit that a crucial achievement of future research in social 
neuroscience will consist in the investigation of the neural correlates of mutual adaptation and the 
reciprocity of human-human social interaction at the intra- as well as the inter-brain level (see 
Figure 1 & 2). Beyond the specific methodological challenges regarding synchronized collection 
and integrated data analysis, a most fundamental challenge involved in this endeavor concerns 
the implementation of ecologically valid and at the same time highly controllable experimental 
settings, suitable both for behavioral and neural investigations (cf. Zaki & Ochsner 2009; Wilms 
et al. 2010). The state of the art in neuroimaging provides severe limitations to studying free-
running interactions using the full range of verbal and nonverbal channels. Most likely successful 
studies will need to identify and isolate salient communicative subsystems. As referenced 
throughout this article human gaze is certainly a most interesting candidate for this type of 
approach as it is a highly social cue, it can be unobtrusively measured and processed in real-time 
using modern eyetracking technology and it can be easily experimentally controlled and 
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dynamically displayed via artificial characters. Advantages of using virtual representations of 
human interlocutors in computer animations instead of real-life-interactions or video have long 
been discussed (see Bente 1989; Blascovich et al. 2002). Early studies using computer-animated 
characters in observational studies concerned with nonverbal behavior confirmed their external 
validity, e.g. when comparing impressions of animated characters with video recordings of real 
people (Bente et al. 2001) and also demonstrated the enormous degrees of freedom in 
experimental control, e.g. when overlaying the same nonverbal behavior on actors of different 
gender (Bente et al. 1996) or neutralizing cultural stereotypes by using standardized animation 
‘dummies’ (Bente et al. 2010). However, it is only recently that the advent of sophisticated 
capture devices for gaze, facial expressions and body movement as well as real time animation 
tools allow for full character control in the framework of truly interactive research paradigms 
(Bailenson et al. 2003; Bente et al. 2008a). Using these technologies in such an interactive 
paradigm, Bente et al. (2007, 2008b) used motion capture devices, data gloves and eyetracking 
devices to capture the nonverbal behavior of two interlocutors and transmit this information in 
real time to the partner’s screen where it was executed by an animated character. The whole 
setting thus established a ‘virtual video conference’ (see Figure 6). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Basic version of an avatar-based interaction platform (screen shot during calibration; virtual 
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characters shown on screen are mirroring the interlocutors own behavior). 
 
 
While movement was left unmodified, gaze was controlled by a computer program, which 
systematically varied the duration of direct gaze. This kind of "blended interaction" allows for 
most realistic and lively displays of interaction while exerting strict experimental control over the 
specific cues under investigation. Furthermore, the computer program can be used to show 
specific responses conditional on the partner's behavior (e.g. to follow the partner’s gaze or not as 
in Schilbach et al. (2010a), to nod after sentence completion, to show averted or directed gaze 
after specific key words or nonverbal signals). Beyond these unprecedented possibilities 
animated characters open for experimental manipulation, they also help to solve problems that 
arise from the application of complex technologies: Showing the interaction partner lying in a 
scanner or wearing an EEG cap, carrying reflectors for movement or face tracking might decrease 
ecological validity more then meeting an avatar in a virtual environment. Measurement devices, 
however, do not only obscure our view of the interlocutor and provide an awkward image of the 
other; they also restrict the behavioral repertoire of the actors, for instance the locomotion radius 
when using a remote eye tracker or the mobility of extremities and head in the fMRI scanner, 
where actions are often limited to simple key presses. By providing options for an elaborate 
action repertoire within the constraints of neuroimaging settings, virtual reality or augmented 
reality setups are, therefore, likely to advance the investigation of the neural underpinnings of 
joint actions (Knoblich & Sebanz 2008; Kokal et al. 2010; Newman-Norlund et al. 2007, 2008). 
On the other hand, the use of (more) mobile data collection devices, such as low-density EEG 
setups or methods such as functional near infra-red spectroscopy (fNIRS), could also help to 
overcome some of the bandwidth problems and create more ecologically valid situations, in 
which participants can use the full range of communicative behavior (e.g. Suda et al. 2010, 
2011). Further, using mobile data collection and analysis devices could help to provide real-time 
visualizations of brain states and investigate how such interactionally presented neuromarkers 
might contribute to and impact on ongoing social interactions. Finally, another important 
question will consist in investigating which insights can be gleaned from quantifying inter-brain 
effects of social interactions and to assess whether two interacting brains provide more 
information about the interaction than the sum of the individual brains (cf. Hasson et al. 2012). 
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Taken together, our review highlights the importance and potential of exploring the neurobiology 
of social cognition from an interactor’s point of view and stresses that the use of more 
ecologically valid, truly interactive setups will help to address the neural bases of interpersonal 
coordination and responsiveness in interaction, which may underlie our seemingly effortless 
ability to apprehend other minds. 
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4. Key Topics & Objectives for Future Research 
The characterization of differences between social cognition from an interactor’s as compared to 
from an observer’s point of view, the differential recruitment of underlying processes and neural 
mechanisms and the investigation of interacting individuals appear as key targets of a second-
person neuroscience (Figure 1 & 2). In section 3.2 we have focused on methods necessary for 
this. The current section highlights how a second-person neuroscience may spark important new 
questions and can help to shed new light on well-known issues. Here, developing approaches for 
data collection and analysis from two interacting persons (and possibly two brains) is relevant, as 
is re-visiting and modifying established experimental paradigms to incorporate an emotionally 
engaged, interactive perspective (see section 2). This means that, in our view, a second-person 
account does not replace first- and third-person accounts, but bookends them to a large degree. 
Consequently, the resulting research questions are concerned with the degree to which the 
accounts differ, and how they interact with each other (see section 4.1). Furthermore, how is it 
that largely automatic, implicit forms of interaction develop into explicit social cognitive 
capacities and how does explicit mind knowledge contribute to ongoing interactions (see section 
4.2.1 & 4.2.2)? Also, if one considers interaction as developmentally prior to mentalizing or 
mirroring, then the question remains what drives interaction. Here, we focus on the importance of 
reward signals and motivational processes relevant for participation in social interaction (see 
section 4.2.3). Finally, we address how insights from a second-person account could be put to use 
in future research using computational neuroscience techniques and in the emerging field of 
social neuroendocrinology (see section 4.3). Overall, the next section, therefore, serves to 
consider potential new avenues that research might take by embracing a second-person approach. 
4.1 Addressing differences between social interaction and observation 
The comparison of processes involved during social cognition from an interactor’s versus from 
an observer’s point of view is a central target of a second-person neuroscience. Basically we see 
three options to address this within the context of measuring a single brain: (a) studies contrasting 
the information one can obtain when being in interaction with versus observing someone 
(learning studies); (b) studies contrasting the effects of being in interaction with versus observing 
someone on subsequent judgments and behavior (priming studies); (c) studies that establish 
whether we are susceptible to different contextual influences when we are interacting versus 
observing. 
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One way to address the first and perhaps the second type of studies is to look at whether being in 
an engaged interaction provides the same information as observation, and if not, how this differs. 
For instance, one could imagine people interacting with a virtual character whereby they have to 
make judgments on the character or adapt their behavior to her. The question would then be 
whether differences in participants’ learning rates and behavior exist depending upon interacting 
with the virtual character themselves as compared to seeing someone else interact with the virtual 
character and what the neural bases of such differences could be. Here, an important hypothesis 
to pursue is that neural plasticity differences could exist in task-specific neural networks 
depending upon one’s own involvement in interaction as compared to situations when we merely 
observe others (cf. Cooper et al., in press). Also, it is conceivable that different routes may lead to 
the activation of a neural network: e.g. in the case of high-functioning autism, patients have failed 
to show activation differences as compared to healthy controls (Gilbert et al. 2009), which might 
be related to their ability to activate ‘social brain’ areas when asked to make a conscious effort to 
do so. Nonetheless, important differences could exist in situations of naturalistic, fast-paced 
social encounters and can only be assessed by providing such situations as a test bed. Another 
important future extension of interactive paradigms will consist in making it possible for two 
participants to engage in a task and to interact in an experimentally controllable way in a 
mediated environment. Such a paradigm would allow to control and change the bandwidth of the 
interaction and could help to systematically perturb an ongoing interaction, e.g. by replaying 
responses of the other interactor from a previous interaction, and to investigate participants’ 
ability to tell apart “whether the other can see me (or not)”. One way in which, we suggest, this 
could be done would be to make use of a dual eyetracking setup, in which two interactors can be 
virtually present and perform a task together (e.g. Carletta et al. 2010; Jermann et al. 2010). 
 
Concerning the second type of studies, we suggest that using the established possibility of 
exploring joint attention in the scanner may help to understand the neural underpinnings of other 
(possibly more explicit) social cognitive tasks: For instance, it has been suggested that being 
actively engaged in triadic interaction may have an impact both on the perception of the other 
person (e.g. his/her trustworthiness and attractiveness) as well as on the perception of an object 
(e.g. its value) that may be jointly attended (Heider 1958). To the best of our knowledge, there 
are no neuroimaging studies, which have targeted the neural correlates of the perception of jointly 
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attended objects. Such studies might be extremely informative, however, with respect to 
identifying the neural correlates of different formats or varying degrees of shared intentionality 
and could also shed light on the complex relationship between implicit and explicit processes 
involved in social cognition (Frith & Frith 2008; see also next subsection). Other applications of 
the method could include investigations of how interactive gaze cues shown by a virtual character 
impact on object-related decision-making or memory performance. Furthermore, the gaze-based 
interaction setup could allow to investigate how being involved in an interaction, during which an 
agent has a high probability of reacting congruently to my gaze behavior by following my gaze, 
impacts on subsequently presented social cognitive tasks: one particularly intriguing case would 
be to explore how interaction-based experiences with an agent modulate performance during a 
subsequently presented task, in which the mental states of the agent (e.g. her desires or beliefs) 
are reacted to, need to be assessed or explicitly reported. Also, exploring the impact of minimal 
forms of social interaction on self- and other-related person judgements and the tendency to show 
pro-social behavior would be particularly relevant and interesting. Apart from asking which 
processes and tendencies might be primed or enhanced by social interaction, it will also be 
important to investigate which cognitive capacities might be perturbed or which processes are 
interfered with during social interaction. Here, an interesting avenue to pursue would be to 
investigate how being a participant of a social interaction might lead to differential effects on 
mnestic processes, such that associative components might be favored as compared to declarative 
memory. 
 
In order to address the third type of studies, one may ask how the situational constraints of a 
social situation may interact with more abstract rules that one can acquire as illustrated by HFA. 
When performing social cognition from an observer’s standpoint, one might be more inclined to 
take into consideration cues that inform us about the psychological traits or dispositions of other 
persons, which may be less closely related to the person’s current psychological state and to what 
the person is actually doing in the precise moment of observation (cf. Jones & Nisbett 1971). On 
the other hand, the integration requirements of direct social interaction may be such that —while 
trying to form an impression of the other— we simultaneously have to adjust and respond to the 
other person’s actions, which means responding to the concretely given and pragmatically 
relevant aspects of the current situation. While social cognition from an observer’s point of view 
is, therefore, likely to rely more upon situation-independent formats of information (e.g. 
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stereotypes), social cognition from an agent's point of view might rely more on making use of 
situational information in order to make sense of the other’s behavior. 
 
4.2 Social interaction and the relationship of implicit and explicit processes in social cognition 
 
4.2.1 From implicit interaction to explicit mentalizing? 
In establishing the relationship between social cognition from an interactor’s as compared to an 
observer’s point of view, the question of implicit and explicit processes in social cognition gains 
further importance. As of today it is largely unclear what the neural signatures of implicit as 
compared to explicit social cognition are (Frith & Frith 2008). There is a theoretical as well as an 
empirical side to this issue, both of which can potentially be elucidated within a second-person 
account. In theoretical terms, it is not always clear what is meant by “implicit social cognition” 
and how this is actually related to awareness on the one hand and automaticity versus control on 
the other. It is never spelled out whether “implicit social cognition” is just what we reason 
consciously about, minus awareness or, if this is not the case, how exactly the former relates to 
the latter. For instance, social interaction may be conceptualized as a prime example of implicit 
learning, as is language, the development of both being closely intertwined (see sections 2.2 and 
2.3). As with implicit language learning, an important question is how we develop an explicit and 
symbolic, or rule-based grasp of language or social interaction based on implicit, predominantly 
associative learning of statistical regularities. If indeed such explicit knowledge is the result of 
exposure to increasingly complex social contexts, it remains unexplained how, and what the 
neural bases of such changes could be. For instance, how do behavioral precursors to TToM 
develop into a capacity to pass classic TToM tasks? 
 
Ontogenetically, becoming an ‘expert’ in social cognition may, we suggest, primarily be a 
question of social interaction while later competencies of more detached, reflective social 
cognition might be a result of reactivating the networks forged during social interactions and re-
describing these interaction-based capacities (cf. Karmiloff-Smith 1992; Cleeremans 2008; 
Cleeremans et al. 2007). In this respect, our proposal links up with theories about the functional 
structure of the brain, which take the “re-use” of neural circuitry for various cognitive purposes to 
be a central organizational principle (e.g. Anderson 2010). According to these theories, it is 
common for neural circuits to be established for one purpose and then to be put to different uses. 
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Crucially, rather than seeing such a re-description as an internally generated, qualitatively 
different representation of discrete knowledge about the world, our second-person approach 
frames such a re-description as an ongoing learning process driven by increasingly complex 
interactive contexts, for instance when moving from dyadic to triadic interaction, which creates 
the possibility and need to somehow communicate with respect to an external, third object or 
person (see also Carpendale & Lewis 2004). Furthermore the involvement of reward signals 
closely related to ongoing social interaction might also be relevant in this respect (Pasley et al. 
2004). Also, in the light of section 2.3, language might in this context not only be shaped by 
social interaction, but also the other way around, with the gradual development of language 
providing a scaffolding that allows implicit social know-how to develop in explicit social 
knowledge. Indeed, as Hutto (2008) suggests, the development from early nonverbal responding 
to others' mental states, which, according to Hutto, is essentially non-contentful, into explicit, 
contentful thinking about others' mental states is probably linguistically mediated. Future 
research in social neuroscience will have to find ways to systematically investigate how activity 
both in the parieto-frontal cortex and the so-called mentalizing network may be shaped and 
modulated by the degree to which human observers perceive themselves as participants of social 
encounters and by actual exposure to social interactions and to understand how this relates to 
recruiting these networks during observation (Schilbach 2010, cf. Wang et al. 2011). 
 
Apart from investigations of real-time dyadic and triadic interaction in healthy persons, we also 
see great potential for investigating real-time social interaction in development and diagnostic 
groups. In spite of the importance of joint attention in ontogeny and a growing number of 
neuroimaging studies in this respect, the neural correlates of this significant phenomenon and 
how it unfolds in real-time are incompletely understood. Given that our paradigm does not rely 
upon verbal information and higher-order reasoning about others’ mental states, but relies upon 
naturally occurring social behavior, it might prove to be particularly useful in this respect and 
could help to address how human infants come to enjoy the sharing of experiences. Furthermore, 
a characterization of the neural signature of mutual and joint attention in infancy could be related 
to the development and neural bases of other social cognitive abilities, which develop later in life 
to investigate commonalities and differences in a longitudinal setup. Such an approach could help 
to directly test whether interaction-based network modulations are later co-opted and re-used for 
higher-order, explicit processes. 
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Furthermore, a litmus test for the second-person approach in ontogeny would be to investigate 
infants’ responses to acts of mentality (e.g. intentional actions, attention, emotional facial 
expressions) depending upon the infant’s ability to respond to them when they receive them. 
Contrary to a simulationist reading, which would predict that infants need to be able to do the 
actions themselves, and to “mind-reading” accounts, which hold that the infant needs to be able 
to observe and conceptualize patterns in order to be able to grasp actions meaningfully, the 
second-person approach suggests that acts of mentality should be meaningful to infants 
depending on the infant's ability to respond to them when they receive them, regardless of 
whether the infants can do the actions themselves. 
 
Thus, a second-person neuroscience will be concerned with the question of how direct social 
interaction with others —and the implicit processes inherent to this— may inform and modulate 
more detached, explicit perspectives on them. Evidence from developmental psychology has been 
taken to suggest that reflective (or ’meta-cognitive’) competence emerges through the infant’s 
social interactions with others by relating one’s own states with those of others (e.g. Rochat & 
Striano 2002). However, a more radical approach holds that it may be only via social interaction 
and in virtue of the fact that we are constantly trying to model other minds in interaction that we 
learn to be conscious and develop both an understanding of ourselves and a conscious percept of 
the world at all (Cleeremans 2011). A study by Bahrami and colleagues (2010) further indicates 
that such interaction-based improvements of introspective abilities continue to be effective during 
adulthood. 
 
4.2.2 From mentalizing and mirroring to automatic interaction? 
A question equally important to an ontogenetic account is how we manage to engage in 
interaction on a daily basis, without referring to explicit knowledge. Instead, we interact and ‘go 
with the flow’, all the while retaining the capacity to reflect upon our interlocutor and ourselves 
afterwards. It is exactly here that neurobiological evidence of TToM-related activations has given 
rise to the idea of “implicit TToM” or “implicit social cognition”. But if this “implicit TToM” is 
essentially something different than what we consciously deploy in False Belief tasks, say, then 
what does it represent? It is here that the most immediate empirical questions may be raised: are 
the implicit and explicit processes that occur in interaction actually the same processes as those 
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that occur during observation? We suggest that this may not be so, in that interaction-based 
processes involve at least two aspects. First, they involve an automatic inference component 
based on previously acquired knowledge, which is also present during observation, and which is 
largely impervious to explicit modification. Second, they also require an action-control 
component, which can be fast (<350ms) and based on the previously acquired knowledge, or 
slightly slower (>350ms) and potentially available to control (Khan et al. 2003; Pisella et al. 
2000; Rossetti et al. 2003; Sartori et al. 2009). As such, whereas during interaction implicitly 
activated knowledge seems to be immune to explicit interference (Ambady et al. 2000; Choi et al. 
2005), automatic processes are —due to their action component— susceptible to explicit 
modification, or interference (you drive a car or play a musical instrument without thinking about 
particular movements contributing to it, but you can to some degree bring them under conscious 
control – which under normal circumstances will hamper fluent performance). However, such 
awareness of action is related not only to action preparation (motor signal), but is additionally 
prone to strong reconstructive effects of the sensory consequences of one's actions (Haggard 
2009; Haggard & Tsakiris 2009; Sarrazin et al. 2008; Pacherie 2008; Sato & Yasuda 2005). In an 
observational context, such factors simply do not come into play, whereas in an interactive 
context, this means that the reactions of the other co-determine the degree to which one becomes 
conscious of one's actions, to which anyone who ever committed a serious gaffe in public will 
readily testify. 
 
An illustration of how the reasoning described above might lead to novel approaches lies in 
psychiatric disorders: for instance, autistic persons have been described as having problems with 
implicit or intuitive social cognition. However, in terms of elementary processes, several studies 
have been unable to find problems with implicit learning (Brown et al. 2010), action 
representation (Sebanz et al. 2005), or even mirroring (Southgate & Hamilton 2008). Thus, one 
empirically verifiable possibility would be that, at least in HFA, both low-level and high-level 
processes are relatively intact, but that the application of this implicit know-how versus explicit 
knowledge is disturbed, in that persons with HFA apply explicit, high-level TToM in situations 
where healthy controls ‘trust a gut feeling’. This then could lead to the hypothesis that HFA 
persons lack the know-how or knowledge that would subtend such a gut feeling (their explicit 
knowledge not being rooted in interactive know-how), or, alternatively, that they fail to recognize 
and trust such a gut feeling and instead, in any task allowing explicit reasoning, will opt for such 
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explicit rules instead (failure of automatic application of knowledge, whether know-how or 
explicit knowledge). Crucially, the notion of how these potentially different capacities, implicit 
learning and automatic behavior contribute to autism -and healthy controls- remains elusive in 
passive spectatorial settings. 
 
4.2.3 Motivation and the spark to interaction: Putting reward signals into social cognition 
Another important feat will be to address how motivation- and reward-related signals could be 
differentially engaged during participation in social situations as compared to observation of 
others’ interaction and might interact with brain regions relevant for action control (cf. Pessoa & 
Engelmann 2010; Oullier & Basso 2010; Schonberg et al. 2010; Figure 1). This directly follows 
from our conception of ‘active’ social perception strongly relying upon affective and reward-
based contingencies that result from being personally addressed and prompt responses, which 
feed into ongoing social interaction. Being in the presence of someone, human beings cannot help 
but interact with each other (e.g. Zwickel & Vo 2010), which may be due to an evolutionary 
heritage of depending upon others for survival possibly having rendered social interaction 
‘intrinsically’ rewarding (Coan 2008; Tomasello 2009). Consequently, being a participant (as 
compared to being an observer) of social interaction, we speculate, might also lead to an 
expectation of reciprocation that is more in line with cooperative than competitive behavior and 
motives (Pfeiffer et al., in press). Furthermore, human beings appear to be extremely sensitive to 
having an impact on conspecifics and seem to enjoy exerting such influence from early on in life 
(Fiske & Dépret 1996; Gergely & Watson 1996; Schilbach et al. 2010a). Relatedly, human 
beings not only enjoy being imitated by others (as long as this is done covertly), but this also 
increases feelings of affiliation and rapport (Chartrand & Bargh 1999). Consistently, experiences 
or even hints of social exclusion (even third-party exclusion) increases affiliative imitation (Over 
& Carpenter 2009). One of the factors that make exerting an influence on other persons so 
rewarding, might be their agentivity: first, it vastly increases the action possibilities of the other, 
and hence the uncertainty of what the effect of my action will be (compared to when I interact 
with, say, a vending-machine); second, it might be that simply knowing that the other is an 
independent agent having other options than reacting to you, makes a contingent response very 
rewarding. 
 
To investigate interactions of motivation- and reward-related signals with activity in action 
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control and social cognition networks during participating in social interaction, we have devised a 
non-verbal Turing test, which is based on the interactive eyetracking paradigm used to investigate 
joint attention described in section 3.1.2. In this setup participants engage in gaze-based 
interaction with an anthropomorphic virtual character, whose gaze behavior is said to be 
controlled by another participant or by a computer, while, in fact, it is always controlled by a 
computer algorithm. Using this setup, the character’s gaze reactions were systematically varied 
along a continuum from a maximal probability of gaze aversion to a maximal probability of gaze-
following during brief interactions, thereby varying congruency and contingency of the reactions. 
We investigated how these variations influenced whether participants believed the character to be 
controlled by a person or a computer. In a series of experiments, the confederate was either 
introduced as “naïve“ to the task, “cooperative“ or “competitive“. Results demonstrate that the 
ascription of agency increases with higher congruency of gaze reactions when participants are 
interacting with a “naïve” partner. In contrast, agency ascription was driven by the degree of 
contingency (i.e. the probability of the virtual other reacting) irrespective of congruency (whether 
or not the behavior shown in response was the same or different from the participant’s) reactions 
when the confederate was introduced as “cooperative”. Conversely, during interaction with a 
“competitive” confederate, judgments were neither based on congruency nor on contingency 
(Pfeiffer et al., in press). These results offer important insights into what renders the experience 
of an interaction truly social: Humans appear to have a default expectation of reciprocation as 
evidenced by the naïve condition, which can be influenced drastically by the presumed 
disposition of an interactor to cooperate or compete. This finding, we assume, could be related to 
our neuroimaging results, which were accrued by making use of the same kind of paradigm and 
highlight the involvement of reward-related neurocircuitry during congruent interactions 
(Schilbach et al. 2010a). The use of the Turing test paradigm for neuroimaging purposes is likely 
to advance our understanding of the neural bases of social interaction: For example, it can 
hypothesized that gaze-based interaction with a naïve confederate might lead to an increase in 
neural activity in areas of the so-called mentalizing network while conditions with highly 
congruent reactions might lead to an increase in reward-related brain areas. While competitive 
interactions might also lead to an increase of neural activity in mentalizing areas, it will be 
interesting to investigate whether a competitive context could also lead to a decrease of activity in 
reward-related neurocircuitry. Also, the question can be targeted whether the presence of a shared 
goal (as in the cooperative context), leads to a decrease of activity in the mentalizing system 
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while concomitantly an increase of activity might be observed in regions, which have been 
implicated in coordinated behavior. Furthermore, it will be interesting to investigate whether 
changes in activity of the brain’s reward system in response to positively contingent gaze-
reactions could generalize to contingent reactions irrespective of their valence depending on the 
situational context. Finally, neuroimaging studies, which make use of this paradigm, may help to 
investigate putative connectivity differences between relevant brain areas during social 
interaction (Figure 1), which could help to understand the neural bases of opposing effects 
between imitative behavior and understanding of others’ minds (Stel et al. 2009). 
 
Recent evidence suggests that different reward types recruit the reward system of the brain, 
which has given rise to the suggestion of a ‘common neural currency’ for rewards (Izuma et al. 
2008). The neural mechanisms of differences in the susceptibility for different types of reward, 
however, remain unclear. Also, it is not well known how different reward types may compete and 
can act as a surrogate for one another (e.g. using food rewards when other rewards are 
unavailable) or how social influences may serve as a control mechanism to reward dependency. 
In order to probe the reward system of the brain while at the same time allowing for the use of 
different reward stimuli, the interactive eyetracking paradigm could be adapted to serve as a 
reward-based saccade paradigm. In such a paradigm participants would be asked to generate and 
be rewarded for successfully completing saccades to visual targets. Rewards could be varied to 
include monetary, food and social rewards (congruent gaze reactions of an anthropomorphic 
virtual character also shown on the stimulus screen). On the behavioral level higher reward 
probability for a given target is expected to lead to a decrease in saccade latencies (e.g. Milstein 
& Dorris 2007), whose magnitude may depend upon the specific reward type. On the neural 
level, the correlates of this reward-related bias and possible reward type-specific differences in 
controls and patient groups characterized by social impairments (such patients with autism and 
schizophrenia) are not well known. Research in non-human primates suggests that midbrain 
dopamine neurons involved in motivated saccade tasks receive inputs from many brain areas 
including the ventral and dorsal striatum, the subthalamic nucleus, the amygdala, the lateral 
hypothalamus, the dorsal raphe nucleus and the lateral habenula (Matsumoto & Hikosaka 2009; 
Bromberg-Martin et al. 2010). A comparison of different reward types could not only allow to 
investigate overlap and differences in the underlying neural correlates, but could also allow to 
calculate a scaling factor (i.e. an ‘exchange rate’) between social, monetary and food rewards for 
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each subject. 
 
4.3 An applied second-person neuroscience 
4.3.1 Computational social neuroscience 
While computational neuroimaging studies inspired by game theory and others, which use 
generative models for data analyses, have already taken up the investigation of competitive 
scenarios and are beginning to address cooperative games (e.g. Yoshida et al. 2008), human 
beings’ unparalleled abilities for cooperation in real-time social interaction have largely been left 
unexplored. Here, extending computational social neuroscience approaches to reciprocal and 
adaptive two agent-interactions holds great potential for future research and may allow to 
investigate how differences in perspective towards others, i.e. social cognition from an agent's 
versus from an observer’s point of view, may influence the reliance on different computational 
mechanisms. For instance a study by Hampton et al. (2008) demonstrates the importance of 
representing the possible influence one may have on others in direct interaction. Similarly, recent 
findings from model-based neuroimaging studies already do provide evidence for differences in 
the neural mechanisms of experienced as compared to observational learning (activity changes in 
ventral striatum being selective to instrumental actions; Cooper et al., in press). Computational 
approaches will be particularly powerful in helping to address the history of an ongoing social 
interaction and how learning may occur and unfold. In doing so, model-based analysis of 
neuroimaging data could help to investigate the development of neural networks, their structural 
and neurofunctional underpinnings, during social interaction, thereby helping to understand how 
particular functions develop in particular areas of the brain or specifically the brains of 
interacting minds. One example of how a computational social neuroscience paradigm may help 
to assess and quantify the impact of (gaze-based) social interactions is the following: By 
combining a cooperative game such as the ‘stag hunt’ game developed by Yoshida and 
colleagues (2008) with a gaze-based social interaction manipulation (Schilbach et al. 2010a), it 
becomes feasible to test computational models under more ecologically valid conditions. In light 
of our hypothesis and preliminary findings, which suggest that social interactions may prompt 
collaborative motives, we expect that congruent gaze behavior exhibited by the virtual character 
in our joint attention manipulation may promote cooperative behavior in the ‘stag hunt’ game, 
while gaze aversion of the virtual character may have the opposite effect. Using fMRI while 
participants are involved in gaze-based interactions and in the stag hunt game may also allow to 
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use correlational approaches and multi-variate pattern analysis to predict the level of cooperation 
in the stag hunt from neural activity observed during gaze-based interaction. 
 
Alternatively, future studies could use more elaborate models to control the behavior of a virtual 
character (conversational agents) in more complex ways (e.g. Kelso et al. 2009; Triesch et al. 
2006, 2007; Broz et al., in press). The meaningful use of conversational agents, i.e. completely 
computer generated artificial social entities, in interaction studies, in contrast to avatars would 
require the implementation of basic social skills in the agents, serving the perception, processing 
and production of interactive behavior (see Vogeley & Bente 2010). Such implementations are 
feasible if the scope of behavior is constrained with regard to channel bandwidth (e.g. to eye 
gaze) as well as with regard to the task affordances (e.g. fixation of objects, gaze following, etc). 
However, the available technologies are far from allowing for broadband interactions in open 
conversational situations. Using such an approach might provide a most informative 
complementarity to recent investigations, which have focused on using computational models to 
predict neural responses in a human observer or interactor (e.g. Behrens et al. 2009; Cooper et al., 
in press) and could help to explore the explanatory power of mutually adaptive modeling 
approaches. 
 
4.3.2 Genotype-specific effects and hormonal influences of the neural basis of social interaction 
Recent evidence suggests that important hormonal influences exist, which can specifically affect 
social behavior and its underlying neuroanatomical and neurofunctional correlates (e.g. Chura et 
al. 2010; Hermans et al. 2010; Volman et al. 2011), giving rise to the notion of a field of ‘social 
neuroendocrinology’ (cf. Bos et al. in press). Interestingly, it has been suggested that certain 
hormonal responses only occur in ecologically valid situations (e.g. Henckens et al. 2009), which 
is consistent with the assumptions of the here proposed second-person approach. Therefore, it 
seems likely that using the types of interactive and ecologically valid paradigms endorsed by the 
second-person account may also help to advance the investigation of the complex interplay and 
influence of hormones on the ‘social brain’. In addition, efforts are also being undertaken to 
understand genotype-specific differences in prosocial hormones and brain anatomy and how they 
impact on social behavior (e.g. Tost et al. 2010; Chen & Johnson, in press). Furthermore, we see 
great potential in elucidating how such genotype-specific differences might be related to 
differences in reward-based processing (e.g. Chakrabarti & Baron-Cohen 2011) and could predict 
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differential responses to pharmacological challenges or therapeutic interventions. In the 
following, we, therefore, go on to discuss the possible implications of a second-person approach 
to other minds for our understanding of psychiatric disorders. 
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5. Impact 
 
5.1 Psychiatric disorders as disorders of social cognition 
It has increasingly been recognized that we can conceive of psychiatric disorders as disorders of 
social cognition (e.g. Crespi & Badcock 2008; Vogeley & Newen 2009).4 While there is great 
merit to be found in this endeavour, the above described conceptual and empirical developments 
may be taken to suggest that previous research inspired by this assumption may have over-
emphasized explicit forms of social cognition while recent work, we suggest, indicates that 
related impairments might be more closely linked to difficulties in skillfully engaging in social 
interaction (Schilbach et al., in press). 
 
5.2 The case of high-functioning autism 
“Direct interaction always leads to complications.” 
Patient M.V. 
 
5.2.1 The impact of social gaze on action control and interpersonal coordination in high-
functioning autism 
Autism is characterized by qualitative impairments of social interaction and communication. 
Here, the distinction between implicit and explicit processes has recently been emphasized: 
contrary to popular explanations, what seems to be impaired in high-functioning autism (HFA) is 
not the ability to use explicit mentalistic inference, but rather the implicit processes which 
contribute to participating in social interaction and which allow us to orient towards and 
automatically integrate relevant social cues in more complex situations (Becchio et al. 2007; 
Senju et al. 2009; Kuzmanovic et al. 2011). Individuals with HFA are neither impaired in explicit 
social cognition —as they, in fact, consciously remind themselves to think about the mental states 
of others in an attempt to compensate for interaction difficulties— nor in their capacity of 
implicit learning in general (Brown et al. 2010). Instead they may lack the more basic skills to 
respond intuitively to socially relevant information by generating “adaptive actions upon salient 
                                                
4  While an in-depth analysis of this particular issue is clearly beyond the scope of this article, we would like 
to note that from our standpoint the suggestion of a second-person approach to other minds is consistent with an 
integrative account of psychopathology, which takes into account and weighs data gathered by means of various 
methods, by observation of and in interaction with the patient and those around her in an attempt to explore 
convergences of naturalist and normative reasoning. 
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aspects of the environment” (Klin et al. 2003). The discrepancy between the ability to solve 
explicit social cognitive problems and the inability to meet the demands of everyday life social 
interactions in HFA has been highlighted by methods, which allow probing involuntary aspects 
of behavior. The difference between explicit and implicit social cognition is also nicely captured 
by descriptions of subjective experiences that persons with HFA provide. Here, individuals with 
HFA emphasize a preference for being in an observational stance towards others as this allows to 
‘logically compute’, ‘contemplate’ and ‘think through’ aspects of the situation in a conscious and 
cognitively effortful way. Furthermore being an observer also allows to think about what one 
may know about a given situation and the constraints this may entail for a person who is actually 
in it. On the contrary, the situation becomes remarkably different and more complicated for a 
person with HFA when the person she has quietly been observing turns toward her and tries to 
engage her in interaction. Here, patients describe ‘being flooded’ by information, an ‘inability to 
keep up’ and ‘not knowing when and how’ to respond to what others do possibly due to the 
imperfect contingencies inherent to social interaction (Klin et al. 2009). 
 
We suggest that the impairments of being able to respond intuitively to socially relevant 
information could be closely related to the ability to perceive social affordances, i.e. the 
possibilities for interaction provided by others. In order to investigate the impact of social cues on 
mechanisms of action control, we, therefore, made use of a stimulus-response compatibility 
(SRC) paradigm, in which control and HFA participants were asked to generate spatially 
congruent or incongruent motor responses to changes in a face, a face-like and an object stimulus 
(Schilbach et al., in press). Results demonstrate that while in control participants being looked at 
by a virtual other leads to a reduction of reaction time costs associated with generating a spatially 
incongruent response, this effect is not present in the HFA group. We suggest that this 
modulatory effect of social gaze on action control in control participants might be related to 
social cues triggering motor preparatory programs that may help to coordinate one’s actions with 
those of someone else, rather than providing a mere ‘resonance’ mechanism. It is conceivable 
that participants thereby automatically adjust to the ‘perspective’ of the virtual agent by making 
sense of the situation in pragmatic terms (Sebanz et al. 2006). Hereby, an action that is deemed 
spatially ‘incongruent’ from an allocentric observer’s point of view might end up being 
‘complementary’ to what the participant perceives the (virtual) other do. In other words: being in 
the presence of someone else (even a virtual other) may change our perception of the 
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environment towards perceiving it in terms of the resources or possibilities for actions held 
collectively (“we-space”), rather than individually (e.g. Krueger 2010). 
 
Consistent with the above described interpretation of social cues leading to a recruitment of 
motor-preparatory and action-monitoring-related processes, an fMRI study from our lab using an 
abridged version of the social SRC paradigm in a group of healthy participants, indeed, 
demonstrated that performing incongruent actions in the presence of a virtual other (as compared 
to performing them in response to a non-social stimulus) leads to a differential increase of neural 
activity in brain regions known to be involved in action monitoring and response inhibition 
(anterior cingulate cortex and inferior frontal gyrus), but also areas previously implicated in 
social cognition (dorso-medial prefrontal cortex; see Schilbach et al. 2010b for details). 
Furthermore, reaction time differences between the social and non-social condition appear to be 
closely related to activity changes in the reward system of the brain as measured by BOLD fMRI: 
participants who demonstrated more pronounced activations of the ventral striatum —often 
related to hedonic or rewarding experiences— also found it more difficult to disengage from the 
face stimulus in order to generate incongruent motor responses, which is consistent with 
suggestions of an important influence of reward-related processes on mechanisms of action 
control (cf. Pessoa & Engelmann 2010). Taken together, these results highlight that performing 
actions in a —albeit minimal— social context significantly affects mechanisms of action control 
(Schilbach et al. 2010b, 2011; Gangopadhyay & Schilbach, in press). 
 
Our findings are consistent, therefore, with the proposal of difficulties in the automatic 
integration of social information in HFA while more explicit measures of social cognition may be 
intact as a result of compensatory strategies (Senju et al. 2009; Kuzmanovic et al. 2011). Whereas 
control participants respond to the virtual agent’s gaze by a differential recruitment of motor-
based processes leading to a performance benefit as compared to the object stimulus and by 
recruitment of the brain’s reward system possibly relevant for the hedonic experience of social as 
compared to non-social stimuli, our results seem to suggest no such difference in HFA. In other 
words, individuals with autism may not lack a theory of how other minds work (‘knowing that’), 
but the relevant ‘know-how’ for dealing with others in direct interaction (cf. Zahavi & Parnas 
2003). Also, important differences are likely to exist in the degree to which social interactions 
can evoke comparable responses in reward-related neurocircuitry in patients with HFA (cf. 
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Schultz 2005). 
 
In line with the second-person approach, future research should, therefore, investigate 
impairments of social cognition in autism as reflecting difficulties in skilfully interacting with 
others as those might be at the very heart of the problems faced by patients in everyday-life social 
encounters. We suggest that the investigation of the neural mechanisms underlying these 
clinically relevant differences in high-functioning autism will benefit substantially from using 
more ecologically valid paradigms that look at how people actively engage and interact with one 
another in social encounters. Furthermore, it will be important to relate known differences in 
structural (Catani et al. 2008) and functional connectivity in autism (Kennedy et al. 2006) to 
interaction abilities. Here also, connectivity differences in the mentalizing or default mode 
network (see section 3) and the anti-correlated fronto-parietal network as well as interactions of 
both networks with the reward system of the brain (Camara et al. 2008) appear as primary 
candidates for such studies. Using paradigms that allow control of the bandwidth of the social 
interaction may help to titrate levels of perceptual complexity and differences in the temporal 
structure of an interaction in order to adapt to the differences in functional and structural 
connectivity and concomitant interaction requirements. Also, using mediated social interactions 
could help to provide additional cues for patients to facilitate the interaction. 
 
5.2.2 Language use in high-functioning autism 
According to the view of ‘language-as-action’ or of language as a ‘tool for social interaction’ 
(Tylen et al. 2010), language processing can be regarded as a joint activity, which results in 
entrainment and synchronization between partners on various levels (Pickering & Garrod 2004). 
Furthermore, this ‘grounding’ view of language suggests that words do not contain their 
meaning, but that linguistic labels can be highly negotiable and that interlocutors flexibly seek to 
understand them against the background of a ‘common ground’ (Clark 1996). To this end 
interlocutors produce and monitor paralinguistic cues and one another’s instrumental behavior to 
ensure they, indeed, understand each other. This view of language processing in dialogue —
whereby a partner’s contribution plays a dual role by providing the other person with evidence of 
how the previous utterance has been understood— resonates with our proposal of a second-
person approach to other minds, which also highlights the importance of reciprocal relations and 
their partially constitutive role in interpersonal understanding. Here, the various feedback from an 
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interaction partner and bouts of interpersonal synchronisation shape and structure the ‘interaction 
space’ and the denouement of the social encounter. 
 
In high-functioning autism several language-related abnormalities are present, which, we believe, 
can be best understood in terms of the ‘grounding’ rather than the ‘message model’ view of 
language processing: Individuals with high-functioning autism —in spite of their elaborate 
linguistic code and in the absence of developmental language delay in Asperger’s syndrome— 
have profound difficulties in understanding irony and insist on the use of the literal meaning of 
words, for which a more ‘objective’, rule-based, situation-independent and ‘correct’ usage can be 
determined. Consequently, the language in high-functioning autism is characterized by pragmatic 
and semantic deficits with patients being less likely to integrate contextual information (Groen et 
al. 2010). Consistently, patients seem to have particular difficulties in adapting to the changes in 
linguistic labels in reference to an immediately given social context (Nadig et al. 2009). While in 
normal controls language promotes interpersonal coordination by helping to coordinate attention 
even in the physical absence of an interlocutor (Richardson et al. 2007; Tylen et al. 2010), the 
same does not appear to be true for individuals with high-functioning autism. Patients commonly 
describe difficulties in maintaining telephone conversations due to the fact that they find it nearly 
impossible to know when to speak in the absence of visual cues. While —in summary— the 
predominantly information-based functions of language (as described by the ‘message model’ of 
language) seem to be intact in high-functioning autism, it is the socially constructed and 
interactionally coordinative functions of language, which operate on a more implicit and 
automatic level, that appear to be most impaired (Pexman et al. 2010). 
 
5.2.3 Meeting the interaction requirements of patients with high-functioning autism 
From a clinical perspective, individual reports of patients with HFA from our outpatient clinic are 
also noteworthy, in that patients describe not having any significant impairments of social 
interaction and communication when they interact with other persons diagnosed with HFA, 
which stands in striking opposition to the difficulties, which systematically occur when they 
interact with persons without this diagnosis. While also raising issues about the normative aspects 
of psychiatric diagnoses, these anecdotal reports emphasize that successful interaction and 
communication are crucially a matter of interpersonal adjustments and (possibly) an awareness of 
the interactional requirements of another person. Investigating these issues in patients with 
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autism, we suggest, might help to improve not only psychotherapeutic interventions, but could 
also help to substantially raise public awareness thereby promoting flexibility and openness to 
diversity in styles of social interaction. This is especially crucial for the case of HFA: As we are 
normally not aware of our intuitive, nonverbal capacities that are automatic in nature, we do not 
even have the chance to take notice of the specific deficits in the communicative behavior of 
HFA patients. With respect to the focus of this paper, namely the scientific investigation of real-
time social interactions, it seems most interesting to contrast dyads of neurotypical persons with 
neurotypical-patient and patient-patient dyads. Investigations of the latter type might help to shed 
light on the neural mechanisms, which allow for successful interactions between persons known 
for their social interaction impairments. Also, the study of differences in social interaction 
dynamics could prove to be a promising route and might be developed into a tool for helping 
differential diagnosis in psychiatric disorders. 
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6. Concluding remarks 
 
In this article we have argued for the conception of a second-person approach to other minds 
suggesting that interpersonal understanding is primarily a matter of social interaction and 
emotional engagement with others. We suggest that this account —well-grounded in current 
philosophical considerations— provides a different route to the investigation of intersubjectivity 
by emphasizing aspects of social cognition specifically related to the procedural nature and 
experiential aspects of social interactions. Furthermore, we have argued for the application of this 
approach to the neurobiological investigation of social cognition based on our analysis that ‘dark 
matter’ in social neuroscience remains due to difficulties of investigating and conceptualizing 
real-time social interactions. A second-person neuroscience will, therefore, make use of 
innovative experimental setups to investigate social interaction and its relationship to social 
cognitive abilities in more ecologically valid ways. Such developments will not only help 
neuroscience to really go social, but may also be relevant for our understanding of psychiatric 
disorders construed as disorders of social cognition. 
 
While preliminary neuroscientific evidence suggests that social cognition is, indeed, 
fundamentally different when we are engaged with others, embedded in social interaction, many 
questions remain unanswered. Studies are needed to directly compare social cognition from an 
interactor’s versus from an observer’s point of view. How do putative differences with respect to 
the reliance on underlying mechanisms relate to the large-scale neural networks that are known to 
be involved in social cognition? The use of ecologically valid paradigms to probe social 
cognition, we suggest, will help to elucidate their putatively complementary roles as a function of 
the pragmatic requirements of social interaction and may also help to understand how activity 
might be shaped by the dynamics and ‘history’ of an ongoing interaction. Here, the interaction of 
gaze and other action-related cues will be of paramount importance. Also, studying cooperative 
and competitive interactions in an ecologically valid, emotionally engaged way will be important 
to spell out the functions of active participation and reciprocity in social interaction and how they 
relate to our perception of the human status of an agent. Neither do we know as yet, what the 
relative contributions and neuronal bases of implicit and explicit ways of understanding others in 
interaction as compared to observation are, nor how this may relate to cases of psychiatric 
disorders, which can be thought of as disorders of social cognition. Finally, the precise role of 
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reward signals in social cognition needs to be investigated since they could constitute an 
important driving force for participation in social interactions and could crucially influence other 
aspects of cognition and processes of self-regulation. 
 
By taking social interaction and a second-person approach to knowing minds seriously, future 
investigations in- and outside the field of social neuroscience are likely to provide radically new 
insights into the psychology and neurobiology of how we know other minds and will produce 
evidence for an interactive account of social cognition that emphasizes the constitutive role of 
participating in the social world. 
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